A Keystone State of Mind: Is Pennsylvania a Swing State?

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I am reluctant to present myself as an expert on voters in the Keystone State. I have spent time in a few of the wonderful places of Pennsylvania: Bucks County, Hershey, the Amish country, and of course Philadelphia. I juggle multiple baseball loyalties, and I allowed myself to be in Veterans Stadium cheering the Phillies in Game Five of the 1993 World Series. But these experiences don't give me sufficient insight to make sense of all the politics in Pennsylvania. Still, in a broader sense, what experiences would? Pennsylvania is so complex that it has a way of confounding even the top political analysts within the state. The moral: When it comes to presidential elections in Pennsylvania, don't bet everything on the predictions of the experts. With that in mind, I hope you will be patient with me as I ask the question: Is Pennsylvania a swing state? My answer is that Pennsylvania is an important, perennial battleground state in presidential politics, but it is not a swing state. It does not belong in the "swing club" of very closely contested states that frequently shift between Republican and Democratic presidential candidates. There are other states that fit that bill better.

Before tackling the question of whether Pennsylvania is a swing state, I need to clarify what a swing state is. When we hear about swing states these days in the news media, they are presented as quirky purple states—with quirky swing voters—amidst a patchwork of red and blue states. The term "swing state" first appeared in 1915 in the *New York Times*. However, rarely did one see it until around 1988. The 1988 election turned out to be a close competition between Michael Dukakis and George H.W. Bush. Because of that tight election, political scientists and the media began to notice that a few states were up for grabs in the post-Reagan era, while other states sat squarely in either the Democratic or Republican camp. The media and the parties intensified their focus on voters in this small group of around ten swing states, and discussion of them continues to dominate political coverage.

In the book *Presidential Swing States: Why Only Ten Matter*, my colleagues and I argued that presidential elections were moving toward a situation where the election is effectively already decided in forty states and the District of Columbia.[1] In those forty-one contests, one candidate or the other will win

easily, so the campaigns devote more and more resources to about ten swing states. As we see it, the problem with this state of affairs is that the swing state voters receive the bulk of candidate and surrogate visits, advertising, and grassroots investment from the campaigns—not to mention an inordinate amount of news coverage and analysis of their interests and concerns. The majority of voters sit on the sidelines as spectators because we are unlucky enough to live in states where the presidential election is uncompetitive. For example, between the nominating conventions and Election Day of the 2012 campaign, the presidential and vice-presidential candidates visited only twelve states, and they did not campaign at all in the other thirty-eight states.

Too frequently, the media give a distorted impression that swing states are the same things as battleground states. They are not the same things. All swing states are battlegrounds, but not all battlegrounds are swing states. The exception is Wisconsin, which we believe is a swing state, but which has not yet actually flipped from Democratic winners, and the campaigns in 2016 have not chosen to make it into a battleground. Wisconsin will get more attention later in my remarks.

In *Presidential Swing States*, we developed three criteria that define a swing state. First, a swing state is usually competitive—decided by less than five percentage points in the majority of elections since 1988. Second, a swing state should be a bellwether—that is, in most elections since 1988, the state's popular vote predicts the Electoral College winner. Third, a swing state should show a tendency to swing — we looked for states that actually flipped from one party to the other since 1988. As you can see from Table 1 below, only ten states currently qualify as swing states: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

Table 1: Swing States, 1988 to 2012

SWING STATE	Electoral Votes	**Competitive:** Number of Elections with vote within 5% margin	**Bellwether:** Number of Elections when state popular vote predicts Electoral College Winner	**Flips:** Number of Elections popular vote flips party direction
Colorado	9	3	6	3; RDRRRDD
Florida	29	4	6	3; RRDRRDD
Indiana	11	1	4	2; RRRRRDR
Iowa	6	1	5	2; DDDDRDD
Missouri	10	3	5	2; RDDRRRR
Nevada	6	4	7	3; RDDRRDD
New Hampshire	4	3	6	3; RDDRDDD
New Mexico	5	3	6	3; RDDDRDD
North Carolina	15	4	4	2; RRRRRDR
Ohio	18	5	7	3; RDDRRDD
Wisconsin	10	4	4	0; DDDDDDD
Virginia	13	3	5	1; RRRRRDD

Source: *Presidential Swing States: Why Only Ten Matter*. Edited by David Schultz and Stacey Hunter Hecht. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.

One significant pattern we noticed is that some of the current swing states have been swinging for a long time, like Florida and Ohio. Others, such as Virginia and North Carolina, have not been swinging until recently. Still others, like New Hampshire and Missouri, may have stopped swinging. Finally, there are states like Wisconsin that have not swung, at least not in presidential elections, but they appear poised to start swinging soon. Georgia and Arizona aren't on the list, but they also may be swinging soon.[2] One of our goals in this analysis was to gain a better understanding of why states might start or stop swinging, not only to predict which party a state might lean toward when it stops swinging. There is no way it can be an exact science; every state has its own history, political environment, and leaders. As Yogi Berra once said, "It is hard to make predictions, especially about the future." The best we could do is to identify some signs that might give political scientists advance warning that a state is about to start swinging or stop swinging.

For one thing, polling shows that compared to most other states, swing states tend to have a higher number of people who are independent and do not identify themselves as having loyalty to any political party. Another sign is that swing states have smaller percentages of people who remain undecided in the last three weeks of the campaign, compared to other states. In other words, swing states appear to have more persuadable or swing voters than non-swing states. Therefore, political campaigns try to identify these persuadable voters and then bombard them with canvassers, phone banks, mailings, and Internet ads. Campaigns are getting much better technology to do this kind of persuasion. The key

political difference in the swing states is the intensity with which the swing voters are being courted and persuaded. With all of that intense campaign activity, it is no surprise that the swing states we have identified average about 7% higher voter turnout than the national average and significantly higher turnout than most states where the outcome is not in doubt.

I can summarize a few of these indicators that a state may be about to swing. The first is demographic change—the growth of the minority population in relation to the white population. Swing states generally experience a swift increase in the minority population and a decrease in the white population. It is not always clear how demographic shifts will tilt a state. These shifts can give the Democrats more minority voters, but in some states it might lead white independents to shift toward the Republicans.

Second, these shifts contribute to a rise in the percentage of independent voters. In swing states, they make up a larger percentage of the likely voters than in most uncompetitive states—or "blowout states" as I like to call them. The ten swing states in the election of 2012 averaged about a third of their voters identifying as independents, while the top six most uncompetitive states averaged 26%.[3]

A third warning sign can be a decline in the percentage of undecided voters in the last weeks of the campaign, compared to non-swing states. Although swing states have higher-than-average percentages of independents on pre-election polls, they also show smaller percentages of undecided voters than we see in blowout solid red or blue states. That may sound strange to you, but it is important to remember that independents and undecided voters are not the same things. Though independents take longer to make up their minds than do Democrats or Republicans, and are also more likely to change their minds in reaction to late-breaking surprise news events in October, the vast majority of independents have made up their minds in the last three weeks before the election, and almost all independents have an implicit preference or lean toward one party over the other. Independents do have what psychologists call "implicit preferences" that are hardly noticeable by the independent voters themselves, but psychologists can detect implicit preferences under controlled conditions. One method involves measuring the reaction time between words representing Democrats and Republicans and words representing "self" and "other." Undecided voters who connect one party faster with self and the other party faster with other have an implicit preference that would be impossible to detect in election surveys.[4] The reason there are so many independents but so few undecideds in swing states is perhaps because campaigns are increasingly effective at focusing political messages at key groups of undecided voters and mobilizing the voters who lean toward, or support strongly, their side's presidential candidate. This partly explains why in our research we find not only that there generally are higher percentages of independent voters in swing

states, but also that they lean sooner and more consistently with one party, so there are fewer undecideds in swing states than other states.

WHY PENNSYLVANIA IS NOT (YET) A SWING STATE

A major question in politics as well as political science is whether Pennsylvania is up for grabs in the 2016 election. Is Pennsylvania a swing state? The earlier distinction I made about swing versus battleground states is crucial here. Pennsylvania is indeed the preeminent battleground state and well worth a political investment to try to win it. Every four years the Republican Party thinks it should spend time and money to swing Pennsylvania, because of the possible payoff of winning Pennsylvania's trove of twenty electoral votes or gaining a key Senate seat. Pennsylvania is also a relatively convenient stop for a candidate traveling between swing states like Ohio and New Hampshire. It has been fairly competitive in recent presidential elections and has sided with the national winner five out of the past seven elections. But one thing it has not done since 1988 is swing. Seven out of the past ten elections were won by Democrats. Despite Republican wins in 1980, 1984 and 1988, Pennsylvania tilted to Bill Clinton in 1992 and has voted by large, convincing margins for the Democrat ever since. In 2008 and 2012, Obama won the state by over five percentage points. Perhaps Pennsylvania could surprise us and swing back to the GOP in 2016, but it seems unlikely.

Sometimes being consistent with our concepts means that we end up with some surprising and perhaps counterintuitive results. Take Wisconsin, which our model places into the swing state category. On the surface, Wisconsin would seem an unlikely swing state because it voted for the Democratic presidential candidate in all ten elections since 1976. Nevertheless, there are strong signs that in fact Wisconsin is already a swing state but the parties don't realize it. First, in the past few years, Wisconsin has flipped between parties in statewide gubernatorial elections. Second, Wisconsin's percentage of independent voters is high at 30%, like other swing states. Third, unlike Pennsylvania with its usual comfortable margin for Democrats, Wisconsin's presidential elections have been decided by less than five percentage points in four of the past seven elections since 1988. Fourth, Wisconsin is also moving toward a higher percentage of Republican voters than Democratic voters, with an increasing percentage of independents. Fifth, the CNN exit polls in 2012 showed 35% of the Wisconsin voters were self-described conservatives, an increase from 31% in 2008. Meanwhile liberals showed much less change in Wisconsin.[5] All these points suggests that Wisconsin is primed to swing and that Democratic candidates should not take Wisconsin for granted. So far, it does not appear Clinton's electoral strategy takes this into consideration; only Trump has visited Wisconsin (twice) from September to mid-October.[6]

Now back to Pennsylvania. In 2016, the signs suggest that once again the Democrat has the edge in Pennsylvania.[7] One of the things we do at Quinnipiac University is conduct our own poll. Our Quinnipiac October 17 poll of Pennsylvania likely voters shows Clinton with a four-point lead. Forty-two percent of likely voters in the state identify with the Democrats, compared to 34% as Republican identifiers and 20% as independent. Even though these polls show different margins favoring Clinton, the smartest thing you can do in looking at all of the polls is try to average them over a two-week period. You will get a representation of what is going on in the electorate. In the average of all the major polls over the past ten days, Clinton has a narrow but stable lead (47% to Trump's 42%) that she should be able to maintain if past trends and past patterns of performances by Democrats in the state hold up. Looking further back at the polling average from the last few weeks, Clinton has a comfortable lead, seven points on average. It is a close race, but all the signs say Clinton has the advantage going into November. In a conventional presidential race, it is Clinton's to lose—but we should remember that neither Clinton nor Trump are traditional candidates.[8]

In competitive states generally, and in swing states particularly, the voters are bombarded with political information. What effect might an intense campaign have on a competitive but non-swing state like Pennsylvania? Television ads, visits by the candidates, the feeling of pride among voters in these states that they feel they are special and important. Pennsylvania voters, for example, see far more political advertising than I do in my state of Connecticut. Overall, Pennsylvania has more media markets for political advertisements (Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Wilkes Barre, and Harrisburg) than any other state. Part of the information comes from the high volume of political advertising on TV and radio. The other part comes from direct voter contact by the parties and campaigns and by the interest generated by visits to the state from the candidates and their surrogates.

Table 2: Top Urban Areas with Heaviest Political Advertising, Campaign 2016

Media Market	Dem Ads	Rep Ads	Total Ads	Total Cost (in $Ms)	% Dem Ads
Orlando	5,655	1,039	6,694	8.3	84%
Tampa	4,570	1,340	5,910	5.9	77%
Las Vegas	4,597	923	5,520	4.1	83%
National Cable	4,504	608	5,112	10.9	88%
Charlotte	3,557	1,171	4,728	3.9	75%
Greensboro	3,160	1,053	4,213	1.5	75%
Philadelphia	**3,429**	**561**	**3,990**	**4.2**	**86%**

Source: Kantar Media/CMAG with analysis by the Wesleyan Media Project, 2016. Figures are from September 16, 2016 to October 13, 2016. Figures are from September 16, 2016 to October 13, 2016. Ad numbers include broadcast television, national network and national cable.
<http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/releases/oct-2016/>

Wesleyan University has a great center on political media called the Wesleyan Media Project. They collect all of the political television ads that are broadcast, categorize them, and analyze them in detail. The Wesleyan students work on coding them, identifying them as negative or positive, and so on. What they also do is find out where the ads are airing most intensively. Here are some of their results (see Table 2). From their data, you can see that Orlando and Tampa, Florida, Las Vegas, Nevada, and Charlotte and Greensboro, North Carolina have the highest volume of ads. This is because they are in swing states. There were over ten million dollars spent on political ads in Pennsylvania from September 16 to October 16 this year. Much of this was driven by the competitive Senate race in Pennsylvania, with 26,358 ads—more advertising than any other Senate race this year, according to the Wesleyan Media Project. Then we have Philadelphia. It gets far more Democratic ads than Republican ads. That is no surprise because Clinton will need great turnout from the cities in Pennsylvania in order to win the state. The Clinton campaign has a lot more money to burn than the Trump campaign, and a Democratic challenger that could knock off a vulnerable incumbent Republican Senator. Clinton's team chose to bombard voters in Pennsylvania with these television ads.

Another aspect of the election in Pennsylvania is the gender gap. According to the Quinnipiac Poll, male voters in Pennsylvania favor Trump by around ten percentage points, and female voters prefer Clinton by the same margin. In the past several elections, the gender gap adds extra female support for Democratic presidential candidates and therefore an advantage on Election Day. Not so in 2016, where Trump's advantage with men nearly neutralizes Clinton's advantage with women. There is a larger gender gap now than four year ago, and it is growing wider, according to our Quinnipiac University Poll

(see Table 3). There is a lot of talk about Trump's comments about women and that we have the potential to elect the first woman president, so it is not surprising to see in national polls a larger gender gap now in 2016. Dynamic Democratic women such as Michelle Obama are doing rallies with Clinton and talking about women's issues.

Quinnipiac Poll: Pennsylvania (10/17/2016)

	Total	Men	Women
Clinton	51	45	55
Trump	45	50	40

Quinnipiac Poll: Pennsylvania (10/16/2012)

	Total	Men	Women
Obama	50	43	57
Romney	46	54	39

Table 3: Pennsylvania Gender Gap, 2016 vs. 2012
Sources: Quinnipiac University Poll, October 10-16, 2016, interviews of 660 randomly selected Pennsylvania likely voters. Margin of error = +/- 3.8%. Quinnipiac University Poll, October 12-14, 2012, interviews of 1,519 randomly selected Pennsylvania likely voters. Margin of error = +/- 2.5%.

Remember also however that in 2016 the gender gap in Pennsylvania runs both ways. More men are backing Trump than in previous elections, which nearly neutralizes the gains Clinton was hoping for from the gender gap. Four years ago, Obama benefited more than Clinton from the gender gap. A Quinnipiac Poll showed Obama with an eighteen-point advantage with women, and Romney only having an eleven-point advantage with men (see Table 3). Race, gender, and party are all interacting when we see the gender gap between Clinton and Trump, both here in Pennsylvania and nationally. Trump neutralized the Democratic advantage in the gender gap by attracting white men. We are seeing white men with a high school education who identify as independents and who voted for Obama in 2012 shifting toward Trump. According to the October Quinnipiac poll, Trump has a twenty-point lead over Clinton among white men, which far surpasses Romney's advantage with white men at the same stage before the election in 2012.

Clinton's campaign in Pennsylvania has the difficult job of appealing to these white voters while still mobilizing non-white voters in urban areas like Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. Party affiliation still matters a lot in presidential elections. Yet over the past two cycles, nationally and in Pennsylvania, white men increasingly identify with the Republicans and African-American women increasingly identify with Democrats—whether they are registered for a party or independent. If the Republicans can hold the

loyalty of those key white, high-school-educated voters for the next several years, we might see Pennsylvania become a bona fide swing state. [9]

These gender and racial factors are important for explaining why states start to swing. Wherever we see Republican-tilting competitive states with growing African-American or Latino voting age populations, we see states primed to swing. This happened in places like Iowa and Virginia before they started to swing toward Democrats. We are seeing it beginning in Georgia as well. Democrat-leaning states are primed to start swinging toward the Republicans when white voters are increasingly independent. This is on display in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. Will the undecided voters who are white, male, and independent ultimately support Trump, or Clinton, or just stay home? In a close state like Pennsylvania, the election will probably be decided by the direction these voters take during the final ten days of the campaign.

Swing states represent a strange emerging phenomenon in the U.S. electoral system. For most of the history of presidential elections, the norm was that close margins in the national popular vote translated into many more highly competitive state contests. In 1960, for example, John F. Kennedy won with the smallest popular vote margin in U.S. presidential history, and there were twenty razor-thin competitive states that year. The 1960 election follows the usual historical pattern. In the twenty-seven presidential elections since 1904, only nine have involved five or fewer states decided by less than five percentage points. All those elections with a small number of close states resulted in a landslide — except 2012. Barack Obama's 2012 winning margin in the national popular vote was only four percentage points. If history is a guide, you might expect there were a lot of close state contests. Yet the historical pattern is reversed now. At the state level, 2012 proved to be the closest contest in recent history, with four states decided by less than five percentage points (Florida, Ohio, Virginia and North Carolina). There were thirty-five states in which the winning margin was over 10%--the largest number of blowout states in history. This was the smallest number of close states in modern election history. This new historical pattern has been emerging since 1988, as Table 4 shows. Now, contrary to the rest of presidential election history, the bigger the national blowout in the presidential election, the fewer and fewer states that are competitive.

Table 4: Number of Competitive Presidential States per Election: 1960 -2012

Year	*Number of Competitive States*
1960	20
1964	3
1968	13
1972	0
1976	20
1980	16
1984	3
1988	12
1992	17
1996	11
2000	12
2004	11
2008	7
2012	4

Source: *Presidential Swing States: Why Only Ten Matter.* Edited by David Schultz and Stacey Hunter Hecht. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.

This means that, increasingly, voters in a tinier group of highly competitive swing states are the key to the election, while the rest of us in the other forty or more states sit on the sidelines. When the votes of some groups count more—whether they are votes of powerful interest groups, racial or ethnic groups, or voters in swing states—it is not only unfair, but it also can undermine the legitimacy of the outcome and, more fundamentally, of the electoral process itself. One of the principles of democracy is that every vote should matter roughly equally. If presidential elections are decided by small numbers of voters in just five or six states, that is terrific for independent voters living in the ten swing states but it is not good for our democracy as a whole.

PROBLEMS WITH ELIMINATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

Now here we are with a few minutes of discussion about whether anything can be done about the problems caused by the pattern where a few swing state voters have all the attention and power to pick the president. One solution under discussion to solve our electoral woes from blowout states and swing states is to eliminate the Electoral College. I oppose the current proposals to eliminate the Electoral College. The leading proposal is the National Popular Vote Plan. You can learn more detail by visiting the National Popular Vote website at http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/. The plan is to get states to pass a law requiring that the state's electoral votes be cast for the candidate who wins the national popular vote, regardless of who wins in that state. The legislation would only go into effect when it has been adopted by enough states to deliver the 270 votes needed to win the presidency. In effect, this reform would change

the Electoral College without a constitutional amendment. Eleven states have adopted this legislation, but it still needs support from enough states to provide the 105 electoral votes needed to get to a majority and control the result of the presidential election.

I'm skeptical about this movement to bring about a *de facto* national popular presidential election. Movements to abolish the Electoral College tend to come and go; usually they spring up when a candidate wins the Electoral College but loses the popular vote. It is very hard to amend the Constitution and harder still for the opponents of the Electoral College to agree on a new system that is not worse than the current system. The framers of the Constitution invented the Electoral College as an afterthought and by way of a compromise intended to harmonize the interests of regions, economic classes, and state governments within the federal system. It has never worked the way they hoped, and the last two centuries evolved into the state-by-state, winner-take-all system we now have. Still, the most valuable feature of the Electoral College is that it favors presidential candidates who appeal to a wide variety of regions and voters: farm state voters as well as urban voters, ethnically diverse states and states that are more homogeneous. A national popular vote plan would weaken this requirement so that candidates could focus only on the most populated and vote-rich states and cities. The problems with the Electoral College might be less severe when there are a high number of competitive states, and uncompetitive states do not stay uncompetitive for long. After all, this was the state of affairs for most of American election history, until around 1988.

Assuming the national popular vote plan survived a Supreme Court challenge, it is true that it would make swing states irrelevant, and previously ignored voters in spectator states would become more important. Still, it would not change the fact that campaigns will try to create a winning strategy by focusing on some voters who will help them win. We should not blame the campaigns for this. They play to win with the rules that are given. Without an Electoral College, campaigns would focus less on individual states, but they would focus more on regions, especially where they can squeeze out the maximum number of votes. Parties would compete more for urban votes and compete less for rural/suburban votes. The platforms and emphases of parties would shift accordingly. This will be a challenge to parties because they tend to adapt more slowly than the new rules would require. Key demographic blocs will receive disproportionate amounts of persuasion and grassroots mobilization focus from the national campaigns. Candidates would have less incentive than they do under the Electoral College system to build coalitions of voters across economic, racial, religious, and urban/rural lines. Presidential campaigns of both parties would begin to focus on the most densely populated areas, or on regions where they find high percentages of hardcore partisans who can be mobilized on Election Day. Voter eligibility rules, which vary from state to state, would become more politicized and we would see an escalation in accusations of voter fraud. Demands for uniform national voter registration laws, ballots,

and reforms such as early voting days and mail-in balloting would become nationalized. Eventually, the two-party system would begin to fray, which will make third parties more relevant in presidential elections, but will also mean that winning a plurality of the national popular vote (more than anyone else) but only a minority of the total votes cast will become more and more common. The national popular vote plan does not address this problem of how to ensure a candidate wins a majority (more than half) of the votes. If there are calls for recounts, it is not clear in a national popular vote system how this would be handled. States would no longer base their Electoral College votes solely on their own state's voters, so would recounts of national elections have to be done nationally, or on the state level, or done at all? A contested outcome would be a mess that would make people look back fondly to the 2000 Florida recount fiasco.

For all the faults and distortions of democratic principles in the Electoral College, I fear that instituting a simple national popular vote will create even worse problems. A national popular vote is unlikely to provide additional legitimacy for the election winner. Instead, it would exacerbate the irrelevance of political parties, which I believe would be a bad thing.

Finally, a national popular vote would not make it easier for our government to represent the popular will and get beyond the distrust and gridlock currently plaguing the political system. I argue that other reforms would address core problems in our electoral process more effectively and with fewer bad side effects than would instituting a national popular vote system for presidential elections. A better approach is reforming the party primary system. Primaries need to be made fairer and less frontloaded so that they do not favor a few early-primary swing states. Primary reform might encourage more moderate presidential candidates to run if they think they can compete beyond a small group of swing states. Another good idea is to close the dark money loophole that allows unlimited and undisclosed spending by corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals. Regardless of your view on campaign finance reform, the bad side effect of all this money is that nearly all of it is spent in the swing states, and we can't really tell which interests are spending it.

The implications of these reforms are almost impossible to fully calculate, but the national popular vote idea is the one with the most unknowns. My view is that we should remain cautious in our hopes that a national popular vote system will automatically lead to more voter interest, greater engagement, a fairer distribution of candidate visits, and enhanced grassroots mobilization efforts. As much as the Electoral College contributes to the ills of presidential elections, it will be hard to devise a new alternative system that will not make things worse. If you favor a national popular vote as a cure for the swing state dilemma, be careful what you wish for.

NOTES

1. David Schultz and Stacey Hunter Hecht, Eds. *Presidential Swing States: Why Only Ten Matter* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).
2. The idea that Wisconsin is already a swing state was quite controversial in 2015 when we began publicizing our research. It also raised skepticism from audience members in this Juniata College presentation. However, the 2016 election proved how prophetic we were. Wisconsin, part of Hillary Clinton's "blue wall" that was assumed to vote Democrat, shocked the political world by giving Donald Trump a razor-thin victory of 22,748 votes, a margin of 0.07%.
3. National Voter Pool/NBC News, 2012. Exit Poll. <http://elections.nbcnews.com/ns/politics/2012/all/president/#exitPoll>
4. Carlee Beth Hawkins, "The Independent Voter: Not So Middle-of-the-Road After All," *Society of Personality and Social Psychology Connections*, Dec. 8, 2012. Web. Accessed November 18, 2014. https://spsptalks.wordpress.com/2012/12/08/the-independent-voter-not-so-middle-of-the-road-after-all/
5. And as it turned out in the CNN exit poll for 2016, conservatives in the Wisconsin electorate soared up to 34%– an increase of 4% since 2008 – while the proportion of liberals has remained virtually unchanged. CNN 2016 Presidential Election Exit Poll: Wisconsin. < http://edition.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/wisconsin/president>
6. National Journal 2016. "Travel Tracker." < http://traveltracker.nationaljournal.com/>
7. Of course as we now know, Pennsylvania was a surprise win for Donald Trump, as he took the state by a narrow margin of 44,202—a difference of 0.7%.
8. Another prediction made at Juniata College, undermined by the Election 2016 results. Donald Trump won by a margin of 0.07%. Given the analysis of Pennsylvania in this presentation, should I have seen this coming? Still, the surprise news on the very next day after this talk was given was FBI Director James Comey's letter to Congress announcing that additional Clinton State Department emails were discovered on the confiscated computer of former Rep. Anthony Weiner, breathed new life into Trump's campaign and gave swing state voters reason to reconsider their vote choices.
9. CNN's Exit polls after Election Day 2016 ultimately showed even greater support for Trump among white males than the Quinnipiac Poll showed in mid-October. In the exit poll there was a 30-point margin for Trump, compared to a 20-point advantage for Romney in 2012 exit polls. This difference in white male support in the late October Pennsylvania Quinnipiac Poll and the post-election Pennsylvania CNN poll is perhaps the most surprising factor accounting for Trump's comeback victory in Pennsylvania. CNN, 2016. Pennsylvania Exit Polls. http://edition.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/pennsylvania/president

   For a fuller discussion for the disparity of pre-election polls and exit polls for white high school educated males and the concept of conservative nonresponse biases in pre-election polls, see Scott McLean, "What's Going On With These Final Week Election Polls?" *The Hill*, November 2, 2016. <http://origin-nyi.thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/304709-whats-going-on-in-these-final-week-election-polls>